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When judges decide how to interpret laws, they cite many factors to 
support their favored interpretations.  Among these factors, judges often 
cite the meanings of the words in the laws and the intentions of the 
legislators who passed the laws.  These two factors have led to two schools 
of thought about legal interpretation: textualism and intentionalism. 
At the most general level, textualists claim that the meanings of the 
words in the text should guide interpretation, whereas intentionalists 
claim that an author’s intentions should guide interpretation.  These 
doctrines could be adopted for all interpretations of language, including 
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interpretations of literature, the Bible, and everyday conversation, in 
addition to law.  However, because there might be differences among the 
standards of interpretation in various areas, or even among different 
actors in a legal system, I will focus on legal interpretations by judges.  
Judicial textualists claim that the common meanings of words in laws 
should guide judicial interpretations of those laws, whereas judicial 
intentionalists claim that such interpretations should be guided by the 
intentions of legislators (or of earlier judges when precedents are 
interpreted). 
This crude characterization leaves it unclear whether textualists claim 
that word meanings are the only thing that should guide interpretation.  
If so, I will call them exclusive textualists, because they exclude factors 
other than the text.  Exclusive judicial textualism implies that judges should 
never base their legal interpretations on anyone’s intentions.  Analogously, 
exclusive legal intentionalism implies that judicial interpretations should 
never be guided by common meanings of words in laws.  Such exclusive 
intentionalists might grant that words can be used indirectly as evidence 
of intentions, but it is fundamentally only intentions that matter in their 
view. 
Many compromises fall between exclusive intentionalism and exclusive 
textualism.  One position is that both authors’ intentions and common 
word meanings should guide interpretation in every case.  An alternative 
holds that intentions are primary in the sense that clear authors’ 
intentions always override word meaning when these factors conflict, 
but word meanings still determine the correct interpretation when 
authors’ intentions are unclear.  Or one could hold that word meanings are 
primary in this way.  Yet another possibility is that intentions are 
primary in some areas of law (say, private contracts and wills) whereas 
common word meanings are primary in other areas of law (such as 
criminal and constitutional law).  It is not clear whether such intermediate 
views should be classified as intentionalist or textualist, so I will just call 
them mixed views. 
Such mixed views seem attractive, but the extreme positions have 
been popular among legal theorists.  Justice Scalia, for example, argues 
that “[i]t is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.” 1 Scalia, 
 1. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  As 
Alexander and Prakash point out, it is not clear that Scalia’s textualism is totally 
exclusive because he allows corrections for “scrivener’s errors.”  Larry Alexander & 
Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?”  Why Intention Free Interpretation 
is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 980 (2004).  However, like Alexander and 
Prakash, I am more interested in the positions than in who held them. 
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thus, seems to be an exclusive textualist.  On the other extreme, 
exclusive intentionalism has been advocated by Stanley Fish, Steven 
Knapp, and Walter Benn Michaels (all of whom defended it at the 
Workshop on Legal Interpretation at the University of San Diego, which 
motivated this Paper).  The debate between these extreme positions has 
raged for a long time. 
Recently, Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash have given new 
and interesting arguments for exclusive intentionalism.2  They maintain 
that there can be no such thing as common public meanings of words 
apart from any author’s intentions.3  This conclusion obviously rules out 
exclusive textualism.  In addition, it leaves no room for any kind of 
mixed view.  If Alexander and Prakash are correct, it does not even 
make sense to ask when word meanings matter or how much they matter 
in relation to intentions, since word meanings do not exist independently 
of authors’ intentions. 
Against these arguments, I will defend the coherence and importance 
of word meaning.  In Part I, I will more precisely define the thesis that 
Alexander and Prakash deny and I defend.  In Part II, I will show why 
Alexander and Prakash’s arguments fail to rule out word meanings.  In 
Part III, I will put these debates in a larger theoretical context and show 
why word meaning is important to legal interpretation. 
I.  WHAT IS EXCLUSIVE INTENTIONALISM? 
Alexander and Prakash argue against what they call “an especially 
strong form of conceptual textualism.”4  This is “the position that texts 
can be interpreted without any reference, express or implied, to the 
meaning intended by the author of the text.”5  This thesis needs to be 
clarified in several ways in order to specify the claim that I will defend 
here. 
 2. See generally Alexander & Prakash, supra note 1. 
 3. Exclusive intentionalists also rule out sentence meaning, so they would not be 
satisfied by the view that words have no meanings by themselves but only in the context 
of sentences.  To avoid having to repeat “meanings of words and/or sentences” and 
“word meaning and/or sentence meaning,” I will refer simply to word meaning.  I intend 
this notion broadly enough to encompass sentence meaning as well.  This simplification 
will not affect my main points because exclusive intentionalists deny both sentence 
meaning and word meaning. 
 4. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 1, at 968. 
 5. Id. 




First, I take “texts” in this quotation to refer to some texts, not all texts.  
Some texts cannot be interpreted at all, since they are meaningless, so 
nobody should believe that all texts can be interpreted without reference 
to authors’ intentions.  Moreover, I can also admit that some meaningful 
texts cannot be interpreted properly without reference to authors’ 
intentions.  So my claim is only that some texts can be interpreted 
independently of authors’ intended meanings.  This qualification is fair 
to Alexander and Prakash because they want to show that “Intention 
Free Interpretation is an Impossibility.”6  This strong thesis cannot be 
true if even some texts can be interpreted independently of an author’s 
intended meaning.  Hence, they need to deny that any texts can ever be 
interpreted in that way. 
Second, their thesis denies a possibility: that some texts can be 
interpreted in a certain way.  To defeat this claim, I do not need to say that 
any texts must be or are interpreted independently of authors’ intended 
meanings.  I also do not need to claim that texts should be interpreted 
this way.  All I need to claim is that it is possible to interpret texts this 
way.  Accordingly, I admit that particular utterances of texts can also be 
interpreted in another way.  In my view, a particular use of a certain text 
on a certain occasion can be interpreted in two ways.  First, interpreters 
can ask what the speaker meaning is.  This depends on the author’s 
intended meanings.  Alternatively, interpreters can ask what the word 
meaning is.  This does not depend on this author’s intended meanings.  
Because I admit both kinds of meaning, I do not deny that texts can be 
interpreted according to their authors’ intended meanings.  But I do 
claim that texts can also be interpreted in another way that is independent of 
their authors’ intended meanings.  That possibility is what Alexander 
and Prakash deny. 
This dichotomy makes it misleading to characterize our debate as one 
over what the meaning of a text is.  The real issue is which kind of 
meaning should guide interpretation of the law by judges.  Alexander 
and Prakash deny that there are two kinds of meaning that could guide 
interpretation because they deny that word meanings exist independently 
of authors’ intentions or speaker meanings.  If words do have meanings 
independent of intentions of specific authors, then judges can interpret 
laws by those word meanings.  That possibility is enough to refute their 
subtitle. 
Third, it is crucial to notice that Alexander and Prakash’s thesis is 
about “the meaning intended by the author of the text.”7  Word meaning 
might depend on other intentions of the author or on meanings intended 
 6. See the subtitle to Alexander & Prakash, supra note 1. 
 7. Id. at 968 (emphasis added). 
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by other people.  Perhaps the meaning of a word is best analyzed in 
terms of what common speakers would usually intend if they uttered that 
word in a standard context.  I take no stand here on whether that analysis 
of word meaning is correct.  Even if it is, word meaning still does not 
depend on the intentions of a particular author on a particular occasion.  
“The meaning intended by the author of the text” can diverge radically 
from what common speakers would usually mean by the same word.  I 
will discuss examples of this divergence below.  The point for now is 
simply that the issue between me and Alexander and Prakash is not 
about intentions in general, but is rather about a specific intention of a 
specific person, namely, the author. 
This author need not be actual.  Alexander and Prakash specify that 
their arguments are “not meant to show that interpretation is possible 
only if one examines the intent of the actual author.”8  They include 
hypothetical authors as authors.  However, to be relevant, a hypothetical 
author must be one that the interpreter somehow has “in mind.”9  Hence, 
a hypothetical author that is never postulated or assumed by a particular 
interpreter cannot show that this interpreter is using that author’s 
intentions.  Moreover, Alexander and Prakash are not talking about 
intentions of other people who are neither actual nor hypothetical 
authors of the specific text.  Thus, to refer to what other actual speakers 
mean or have meant by a word in a text is not to postulate an author of 
that particular text.  Their notion of an author is flexible, but it is not that 
flexible. 
It is also important that the relevant intention is about meaning.  When 
a speaker utters a sentence, the speaker usually intends to perform a 
speech act (such as commanding) and also to bring about some effect 
(such as to change behavior or to reduce harms).  The goal that a 
legislator intends to bring about by voting for a law is called the 
legislator’s purpose.  When enough legislators share a purpose, it is 
called the purpose of the law.  However, as Alexander and Prakash 
emphasize in their Appendix I, this goal or purpose is distinct from “the 
meaning intended by the author of the text.”10  The intended meaning is 
not the author’s goal, although it might be the author’s means to that 
goal.  What is intended is not an effect in the world but rather a meaning.  
 8. Id. at 969 n.2. 
 9. Id. at 976. 
 10. Id. at 968, 992 (emphasis added). 




The dispute between us concerns this specific kind of intention in the 
author. 
Alexander and Prakash obscure this issue by calling this thesis 
“intention free” textualism.  I do not claim that meanings are free or 
independent of all intentions.  Hence, it is misleading to describe my 
view or any mixed view as “intention free.”  We will see that many of 
Alexander and Prakash’s arguments fail because they forget that their 
opponents can invoke some intentions, while claiming that word 
meanings are independent of the author’s intended meaning. 
Finally, it is also crucial to determine who the author is.  Suppose I 
quote someone but I intend to mean something very different from what 
he meant.  I say, “that’s the exception that proves the rule.”  What I 
mean is “that’s the exception that supports the rule or proves that it 
holds.”  In contrast, the original author of this saying meant “that’s the 
exception that tests the rule or determines whether the rule holds.”  Also 
suppose (as is the case) that most people in my day use this expression to 
mean what I mean by it.  Now, who counts as the author?  It seems most 
natural to say that what I mean depends on what I intend, not on what 
the original author of those words intended, perhaps long ago.  In other 
words, the speaker meaning of a use of a text on an occasion depends on 
the intentions of the person who is using that text on that occasion.  
However, this analogy has striking implications for legal interpretation.  
It suggests that it is not the intentions of the framers or ratifiers of the 
Constitution that determine the speaker meaning of the Constitution 
today.  Instead, it is the intentions of speakers today who are using 
clauses in the Constitution to mean something else, at least if most 
people today mean what they mean and not what was originally meant.  I 
doubt that Alexander and Prakash would welcome this result.  In any 
case, they need to decide whether “the author” is the original author 
(framers or ratifiers in the case of the Constitution) or contemporary 
users of those same words.  Luckily, I do not have to decide.  In my 
mixed view, both what speakers meant originally and what speakers 
mean today can be relevant in different kinds of cases; but so can (past 
or present) word meaning. 
Maybe Alexander and Prakash do not deny mixed theories like mine.  
Sometimes they seem to argue only against “intention free” interpretation. 
For example, they write, “what unites textualists is their stated refusal to 
consider the intentions of the laws’ authors to determine what the laws 
mean.”11  If this claim is all that they deny, then they assert only that 
authors’ intended meanings play some role in some legal interpretation.  
However, their subtitle and much of their text certainly makes it seem as 
 11. Id. at 972. 
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if their thesis is stronger.  If “intention free interpretation is an impossibility,” 
then there is no such thing as word meaning to play any role in any 
interpretation.  Anyway, I do not need to decide what Alexander and 
Prakash meant.  My main concern is the denial of word meanings.  To 
discuss this thesis, I will assume that Alexander and Prakash really mean 
what they say in their subtitle, so they deny mixed views along with 
word meaning. 
II.  ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUSIVE INTENTIONALISM 
Now that Alexander and Prakash’s thesis is clear (I hope), it is time to 
ask whether it is true.  They give five arguments against the possibility 
of word meaning.  I will take on these arguments one by one. 
A.  The Intention to Use a Certain Language 
First, Alexander and Prakash point out that if someone uses the word 
“canard,” we cannot know what this speaker means until we know which 
language this speaker intends to use.12  “Canard” means “duck” in French, 
but the same string of letters or sounds means “fib” in English.  Of 
course, it is often easy to tell which language someone is speaking by 
whether the surrounding words are French or English, but that is just 
evidence of the author’s intent. 
I grant that we cannot tell what this speaker means until we know 
which language this speaker intends to speak.  That is not in dispute.  It 
is, however, beside the point.  Remember that my position is that texts or 
uses of texts can be interpreted either by speaker meaning or by word 
meaning.  Hence, I grant that uses of texts have speaker meanings.  I 
also grant that those speaker meanings depend on their author’s intent.  
None of this begins to show that there cannot be word meanings or that 
those word meanings are not independent of authors’ intended speaker 
meanings or that texts cannot be interpreted according to their word 
meanings. 
Moreover, the intention that I need to know in order to determine 
whether a speaker intends to be speaking French or English is simply an 
intention regarding one language or the other.  It is not an intention to 
mean anything specific by any specific word in that language.  Thus, 
even if Alexander and Prakash’s example did show that word meaning 
 12. Id. at 974–75. 




does depend on some intention, it still would not show that word 
meaning depends on the specific intention that is relevant to our dispute.  
Word meaning can be independent of a speaker’s intention to mean 
anything by a word in a particular use even if it is not independent of 
other intentions, including the intention to speak in one language instead 
of another. 
In their example, the word “canard” has one word meaning in English 
and a different word meaning in French.  To know which of these 
meanings (or something else) is intended by a speaker in a particular 
use, interpreters need to know which language the speaker intends to 
speak in.  However, the speaker might intend to speak in French but still 
not intend to mean what this word does mean in French.  The speaker 
might, for example, intend to speak in French but falsely think that the 
word “canard” means “pig” in French.  Then this speaker might intend to 
speak French but still intend to mean “pig” by “canard.”  This speaker’s 
ineptitude does not, however, change the word meaning of “canard.”  
The word “canard” still means “duck” in French (and “fib” in English).  
That is how we know that the speaker is inept and mistaken about what 
this word means in French.  Thus, neither the meanings of words nor the 
possibility of word meaning is affected by a particular speaker’s 
intentions on a particular occasion. 
The same point applies to dialects.  Alexander and Prakash give the 
example of “chips” meaning “French fried potatoes” in British English 
but thinner, crispier “potato chips” in American English (what the 
British call “crisps”), as well as “microchips” in the dialect of computer 
geeks.13  So what?  The fact that words can have different meanings in 
different languages and dialects does not show in the least that words do 
not have any word meanings.  It shows only that some words have more 
than one word meaning. 
Alexander responded in conversation by asking whether a word takes 
on a new word meaning when it is used to mean something new by two 
people or three or four or more.  In some contexts, “bad” means “good,” 
but how many people need to use it to mean “good” in order for the 
word “bad” to gain that new meaning as a word meaning?  I admit that 
we cannot specify a number, but this is no surprise and no problem.  I 
also cannot specify a number of years after which people become old; 
yet, some people are old.  Similarly, my inability to specify how many 
speakers must use a word with a certain speaker’s meaning in order for 
that word to take on a new word meaning does not show that no word 
has any word meaning.  There can be clear examples on both sides 
despite a large area of vagueness in between. 
 13. Id. at 975. 
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Besides, it is really too simple to ask whether a word has a certain 
word meaning.  To be precise, we need to say that a word has a word 
meaning in a given language.  The word then has that word meaning 
only if that language exists.  The language exists only if an adequate 
speech community uses that language.  In this view, then, the vagueness 
concerns only which speech communities and languages exist.  Without 
solving that problem, I can still say that a word has meaning in a language.  
That is enough to defend the thesis that some words do have word 
meanings against such examples, assuming only that some languages exist. 
Alexander and Prakash give one more argument in this section.  
Consider “the following amusingly bewildering statement: ‘I am speaking 
English, not Schmenglish,’ which in Schmenglish means ‘I am speaking 
Schmenglish, not English.’  Is this statement in English or Schmenglish . . . ?”14  
Alexander and Prakash assert that defenders of word meaning cannot 
answer this question.  Why not?  It has one meaning in English and 
another meaning in Schmenglish.  A paradox arises only if one assumes 
that interpreters need to “identify the language of the text.”15  However, 
if a text can have a word meaning in one language, there is no reason 
why the same text cannot have another word meaning in a different 
language.  Then I do not need to identify one language as the one and 
only language of the text.  Of course, judges will have to choose which 
language and word meaning to use in making a legal decision, but their 
choice does not show or assume that the text did not also have another 
word meaning in the other language.  Once we recognize the possibility 
of multiple word meanings in a single text, Alexander and Prakash’s 
paradox is easy to solve. 
B.  The Intention to Mean Something Rather than Nothing 
Alexander and Prakash’s second argument is that whether a string of 
symbols is meaningful or is a text at all depends on whether it was 
produced by an author who intended to mean something by it.16  Hence, 
one cannot know whether a series of marks is a text or is meaningful 
without first determining its author’s intentions. 
The problem with this argument is that it focuses on the wrong 
intentions.  One intention is the intention to mean something as opposed 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 974 (emphasis added). 
 16. Id. at 976. 




to nothing, that is, to say something meaningful.  Another intention is 
the intention to mean something in particular as opposed to something 
else.  My dispute with Alexander and Prakash concerns the latter.  I 
claim (and they deny) that texts can be interpreted by word meanings 
independently of “the meaning intended by the author of the text.”  The 
disputed thesis does not concern the intention to mean something as 
opposed to meaning nothing.  Hence, I can grant that no text has a 
meaning independent of all authors’ intentions.  Indeed, I can grant that 
no string of marks is a text or has a meaning independent of some (actual 
or hypothetical) author’s intentions to mean something (as opposed to 
nothing) by that text—some author’s intention to produce a meaningful 
text. 
Although I can grant that much, I do not have to, and I do not want to.  
It seems to me that a pattern of marks can have a word meaning without 
being produced by any author, much less by any author who intends that 
pattern of marks to be meaningful.17  Suppose lightning strikes a tree 
next to an intersection and leaves marks on the tree that exemplify the 
pattern “STOP.”  An observer who speaks English says (in French—I’ll 
translate), “Wow!  Look at those marks!  I can’t believe it.  Lightning 
produced a word.”  A visiting friend who speaks only French then 
responds (in French, of course), “Really?  What does it mean?”  The 
English speaker answers (again in French, but I’ll keep translating), 
“Those marks mean STOP in English.”  This last claim seems both 
intelligible and true.  But everyone in the conversation knows full well 
that the marks had no author who intended them to be meaningful.  
Therefore, no author’s intention to produce a meaningful text is needed 
in order for a series of marks to have word meaning. 
The case becomes even clearer when the speech community enters the 
story.  Suppose that drivers who approach the intersection and see the 
tree regularly stop just as if a normal stop sign were there.  This goes on 
for years.  Drivers coming the other way come to expect this.  The marks 
on the tree have gained word meaning throughout this community.  
Moreover, it is legally enforceable.  One day someone drives past the 
tree without stopping and is hit by a driver on the cross street who was 
expecting the other driver to follow the usual pattern of stopping at the 
tree.  The other driver lives in this community and knows that drivers are 
expected to stop at the tree.  It is not a no-fault jurisdiction, so a court 
awards damages to the driver who was hit by the other driver who did 
not stop at the tree, and this decision is upheld on appeal.  I do not think 
that this decision is obviously wrong.  That shows that the marks on the 
 17. A similar view is defended by Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 
509 (1989).  I am deeply indebted to Schauer’s work. 
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tree have a legally enforceable word meaning.  Hence, an author’s 
intention to produce a meaningful text is not necessary either for word 
meaning in general or for word meaning to be legally enforceable.  What 
gives the marks their meanings are the ways in which they are understood 
by the community, not the way in which they were produced.  What 
matters is readers rather than authors.18
Alexander and Prakash might respond that the community intends the 
sign to mean “STOP.”  However, in my example, nobody in the community 
makes any plan to use the sign in this way.  They all just acquiesce 
passively to a rising regularity.  That is how many conventions develop.  
Because no individual plans to use the sign for any purpose, no 
individual intends to use the sign to mean what it means.  They just take 
it to mean “STOP” because they realize that others take it to mean that.  
Because no individual in the community intends the sign to mean 
anything, and the community never acts as a whole to consider the sign 
at all, there is no reason to think that the community intends the sign to 
mean anything.  They are all readers, not authors. 
Alexander and Prakash suggest two more responses.  First, they say 
that the community must interpret the tree marks by postulating an 
author and asking what a normal speaker would have meant by the sign 
if an author had produced the sign.  I do not deny that many drivers will 
engage in such imaginative fiction.  However, it is not necessary.  You 
can understand exactly what is going on without postulating any author.  
If a particular driver named Carol knows that all or most other drivers 
take the sign to mean “STOP,” so drivers coming on the cross street will 
expect other drivers to stop when they come to the tree, then Carol can 
say on that basis that the tree sign means “STOP” even if Carol 
resolutely refuses to engage in any fiction about any author with any 
intention.  Exclusive intentionalists might respond that Carol must 
postulate an author of some kind.  However, this claim of necessity begs 
 18. Consider also how we teach language to babies.  When a baby first makes a 
sound like “dog,” parents reward the child by smiling, giving it attention, and maybe 
bringing the dog closer.  Later, when the child makes a sound like “dog” in the presence 
of a dog, but not while looking at it, parents often treat the child as if he or she intended 
the sound to have its usual meaning.  They say, “Wow!  You said, ‘dog.’  Your first 
word!  Hurray!”  The parents know (or should know) that the child did not intend the 
usual meaning of “dog,” but the normal way to teach the word is to interpret the sound as 
having its usual word meaning long before the child intends that meaning.  For this to 
work, the word meaning must be independent of what the baby intended.  Thanks to 
Joshua Fairfield for making this point in discussion. 
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the question if it is not supported by any independent argument.  Mere 
assertion without argument cannot show anything.  And no reason is 
given for believing that interpreters cannot do just fine without 
imagining an author that they know does not exist. 
Moreover, consider those who do postulate or posit an author.  How 
do they know what a common speaker would have meant by those 
marks?  Simple: they know what those marks mean in English.  They 
know the word meaning of those marks in English.  If they did not know 
the word meaning, then they would not be able to imagine what a 
common speaker would have meant by those marks.  To see this, just 
imagine that lightning produces a Chinese character that you do not 
recognize.  Then someone asks what an author would have meant by that 
mark if an author had produced that mark.  You would have no way to 
answer.  That shows that any postulation of a hypothetical author with 
specific intentions depends on a prior grasp of the word meaning of the 
marks in a language.  So, even if it were necessary to postulate a 
hypothetical author, that need could not be used to show that there are no 
word meanings.  Indeed, it might be used to show the opposite: that 
interpreters need to assume word meanings that are independent of 
particular speakers’ intentions. 
The second response by Alexander and Prakash to my tree example 
cites the multiplicity of languages.  In another possible language, the 
same marks indicating “STOP” might mean “welcome” or anything else.  
There are no limits.  So how can I say that “STOP” has the word 
meaning that it does rather that one of its other possible meanings? 
The answer is that I do not say that, at least when I am being precise.  
Properly speaking, a set of marks does not have a single word meaning.  
What it has is a word meaning in a language.  Thus, “STOP” means 
“halt” in English, even though it means “welcome” in another possible 
language.  Because my tree sign lives in the context of an English-speaking 
community that interprets it in light of its meaning in English, it should 
not be misleading to say that the tree sign means “halt” as shorthand for 
saying that the tree sign means “halt” in English.  Once we get the idea 
that the tree sign has one word meaning in one language and a different 
word meaning in another possible language, all we need to ask is which 
word meaning matters.  That question already presupposes that word 
meanings exist.  And that question is often easy to answer, as it is in my 
tree example.  What matters—at least in some (though not all) uses—is 
determined by the context because it is context that determines how the 
set of marks will be interpreted.  In other cases, where there is an author 
who intends to mean something in a certain language, the important 
word meaning will usually (though not always) be the word meaning in 
the language that the author intended to use.  This admits some role for 
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some intentions in some cases.  However, that is no problem for me in 
my dispute with Alexander and Prakash.  As I already argued, even if 
which word meaning is important does sometimes depend on which 
language the author intends to speak, that does not show that word 
meanings cannot be independent of “the meaning intended by the author 
of the text.”  That intention involves much more than an intention to 
speak a certain language such as standard English.  Thus, word meaning 
can be independent of the former even if it does (sometimes) depend on 
the latter.  That is enough to refute Alexander and Prakash’s second 
argument so far. 
Alexander and Prakash give one more variation: 
[S]uppose a Martian composed the Constitution in our casebook, and that 
Martians treat what we take to be spaces between letters and words as the actual 
letters and words, and regard what we take to be letters and words as the actual 
spaces.  If that is correct, then the “text” in our casebook is quite different from 
the text that we assume.19
In this example, there is not one word with multiple meanings but, 
instead, different words.  The Martian words are white (with black 
spaces), and the English words are black (with white spaces).  This new 
example, however ingenious, causes no trouble for defenders of word 
meaning.  A single piece of paper simply has two texts interspersed 
within each other.  One text has one word meaning in Martian. The other 
text has one word meaning in English.  Judges need to choose which text 
and which meanings to use in reaching legal decisions.  They might 
defer to the Martian authors’ intentions.  However, if common citizens 
have regularly followed the English word meanings of the English text, 
then judges could reasonably use those word meanings in their 
interpretations and decisions, even if they know that the authors were 
Martians. 
Thus, this example does not support their claim that interpretation must 
be guided by authors’ intentions and not by word meanings.  Indeed, it 
suggests the opposite: that reasonable judicial interpretation can be 
guided by word meanings independent of known authors’ intentions. 
C.  The Intention to Mean Something Rather than Something Else 
Alexander and Prakash’s third argument begins with an example: 
“Consider some people who come upon marks on the ground that are 
 19. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 1, at 976. 




shaped like a ‘c,’ an ‘a,’ and a ‘t.’  They begin to debate whether the 
marks mean ‘domestic tabby cat,’ ‘any feline,’ or ‘jazz musician.’”20  
After this start, Alexander and Prakash add three endings. 
In their first variation, the debaters are “told that the marks were made 
by water dripping off a building.  Their debate over meaning should now 
cease: no author, no meaning.”21  I agree, of course, that there is no 
speaker meaning.  That does follow from the absence of any speaker or 
author.  I also agree that the marks have no definite single meaning, so it 
is silly to debate about which meaning the marks have.  Nonetheless, it 
does not follow that the marks have no meaning at all.  The marks might 
have all three meanings—“tabby,” “feline,” and “jazz musician”—in 
different dialects or idiolects within a single language.  My claim that 
words have meanings independent of what the author intends them to 
mean does not imply that each word has a single meaning.  Words can 
be ambiguous.  When a word is truly ambiguous, it is silly to debate 
about which meaning the word really has.  It has both or all of the 
meanings.  You can still debate about what the speaker meant, but that is 
ruled out if there is no speaker.  So I can easily explain why the debate 
in Alexander and Prakash’s example is just as silly as it seems to be. 
Alexander and Prakash might respond that what is really silly is to 
think that the water marks have any meaning at all, much less three 
meanings.  However, I already argued in my discussion of the stop sign 
caused by lightning that marks with no author can have word meanings.  
The point there applies here as well and shows how the marks “c,” “a,” 
and “t” can have word meaning without any author. 
In their second variation, the marks were caused not by water but by a 
person who “tells them that he never intended to make letters.  Rather, 
he was marking out the contours of patches of a vegetable garden.”22  
This variation might seem significantly different from the dripping water 
because here there is not simply an absence of any intention at all.  
There is a seemingly contrary intention and, perhaps, a positive intention 
not to mean anything.  Alexander and Prakash infer that these marks 
have no meaning in this variation. 
That does not follow.  I might intend to utter meaningless gobbledygook 
but, by chance, utter words with meanings in Swahili.  Imagine that a 
Swahili speaker hears me and says, “I didn’t know you spoke Swahili.”  
I respond, “I don’t speak Swahili.  What do those sounds mean in Swahili?”  
He responds, “They mean ‘You are a pig.’”  Of course, I as the speaker 
did not mean anything by these sounds.  That is why he is not offended.  
 20. Id. at 977. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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But he and I still agree that the sounds I uttered have word meaning in 
Swahili.  This shows that sounds or marks that were intended not to have 
any meaning can still have word meaning.  That lesson applies to 
Alexander and Prakash’s second variation on their “cat” example.  Even 
if the person who made those marks intended to mark out the contours of 
patches of a vegetable garden, and even if he positively intended not to 
mean anything by those marks, those marks can still have a word 
meaning within a language. 
In their third variation, the person who made the marks “informs [the 
debaters] that he was writing an ode to his beloved tabby.”  They claim, 
“That should settle the debate: ‘cat’ here means tabby.”23  This conclusion is 
strange.  A tabby cat is a type of cat, so “cat” cannot really mean “tabby.”  
Suppose I have a daughter and no sons; then I say, “I have a child.”  The 
word “child” here does not mean “daughter.”  The word “child” refers to 
the more general classification that also includes sons, and my sentence 
says that I have something that falls within that more general 
classification.  Similarly, in Alexander and Prakash’s third variation, the 
marks “c-a-t” do not mean tabby.  Even if it is used to describe a tabby, 
the word “cat” means some more general classification into which 
tabbies fall. 
Alexander and Prakash might respond that “cat” here means “domestic 
feline.”  But why say that it means “domestic feline” rather than just 
“feline?”  The latter includes wild felines such as tigers and lions, but the 
former does not.  The speaker’s cat does fall into the narrower classification, 
“domestic feline,” and the speaker has in mind a domestic feline, but we 
already saw that this is no reason to think that the word means that 
narrower classification.  Perhaps the speaker, when asked whether his 
ode applies to lions, would respond, “That’s not what I meant.”  But 
what he meant might be different from what his words meant.  The 
speaker might not have thought at all about lions or about whether lions 
fall under the claims in his ode.  This indeterminacy in his intention 
makes it hard to tell whether the speaker meaning is “domestic feline” or 
just “feline.” 
That’s no problem for defenders of word meaning.  We can just say 
that the word “cat” has several meanings within English, and this 
speaker means neither of those word meanings in particular.  The case 
does, however, pose more of a problem for exclusive intentionalists like 
 23. Id. 




Alexander and Prakash.  They claim that what marks mean is determined 
solely by an author’s intention.  If so, and if this speaker does not intend 
“domestic feline” and also does not intend “feline,” then this word has 
neither meaning.  The speaker also cannot have intended “cat” to mean 
the disjunction “either domestic feline or feline,” since that is equivalent 
to “feline,” which the speaker did not intend.  Besides, it seems misleading 
at best to ascribe a disjunctive intention when the speaker never even 
considered either disjunct as opposed to the other.  Thus, Alexander and 
Prakash’s views seem to imply that the word “cat” in this third variation 
does not have any meaning.  That is not what they wanted, and it is not 
plausible. 
The choice between “feline” and “jazz musician” raises other issues, 
because neither includes the other.  A defender of word meaning could 
again say that the word “cat” has both meanings within English, but this 
time it is clear that this speaker does not mean “jazz musician.”  The 
speaker’s intention determines which word meaning is the speaker 
meaning.  That is no problem for the defender of word meaning.  Nor is 
it a problem for exclusive intentionalists. 
There is, however, another approach worth considering.  Word types 
are distinct from word tokens.  If I write the word “cat” twice on a 
chalkboard, there are two tokens of one type.  Suppose I add “This” before 
each token, “is a tabby” after one token, and “that plays a mean trombone” 
after the other token.  Then it might seem natural to say that, even 
though the word type “cat” has both meanings in English, the first token 
of the word type “cat” means “feline,” whereas the second token of the 
word type “cat” means “jazz musician.” 
However, it is misleading to talk of the meanings of word tokens.  To 
see why, consider Alexander and Prakash’s own example of cutting the 
word “cats” out of a magazine article on “The Big Cats of Africa” and 
pasting it into an ode to tabbies.24  Here there is a single token of the 
word “cats” in different contexts.  The speaker meaning varies between 
the different contexts.  Still, the meaning of the word type does not 
change, since the word type has both meanings on both occasions.  We 
could say that the word token changes its meaning as we take it from 
context to context.  However, it is mysterious how and why this would 
happen if the meaning of the word token were separate from the speaker 
meaning.  I suspect that anyone who thinks that this token changes its 
meaning is confusing the meaning of the word token with speaker 
meaning, which does change.  If the meaning of the word token is 
distinct from the speaker meaning, then it is hard to see why it would 
change from context to context when the token does not change.  The 
 24. Id. at 977 n.26. 
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only change in context that would make the word token seem to change 
its meaning is a change in the intention of the speaker who is using the 
token.  That suggests that what really changes is speaker meaning, not 
any sort of word meaning.  If that is right, then there is no need to talk 
about a separate meaning for word tokens at all.  We can talk simply of 
word meaning (which is the meaning of a word type) and of speaker 
meaning (which is what the speaker means by a token of the word type 
in a context). 
Yet another possibility is to say that a word in a context has a 
meaning.  Then, when the word “cats” is cut out of the magazine and 
pasted into an ode to tabbies, the word in the first context has a different 
meaning than the word in the second context.  The problem, again, is to 
individuate contexts.  Differences between contexts will not matter, at 
least to Alexander and Prakash, unless there is some difference between 
the intentions of the authors in the contexts.  But then I can go back and 
say again that the meaning of a word in a context is not really distinct 
from the speaker meaning on that occasion. 
In any case, none of this shows that we can do without the notion of 
word meaning, since we cannot even begin to figure out the meanings of 
a word token or of a word in a context unless we already know the 
meaning of the word type.  If we do not know what the word type “cat” 
means, then we would not know which word in the title “Big Cats of 
Africa” to cut out and paste in our ode to tabbies.  Similarly, if the title 
were in Chinese, then I would not know which character to cut out and 
paste in an ode to tabbies.  This shows that word meaning is needed for 
speaker meaning, even in the odd kinds of cases that Alexander and 
Prakash discuss. 
One final kind of case is perhaps worth exploring.  Suppose a 
linguistics teacher writes the letters “cat” on a chalkboard as an example 
of ambiguity.  The teacher intends the word to be meaningful, but she 
does not intend it to mean “feline,” she does not intend it to mean “jazz 
musician,” and she does not intend it to mean “feline or jazz musician.”  
Because she has no particular intention, the word would seem to have no 
meaning, according to exclusive intentionalists.  But the word does have 
at least one meaning in this context.  Otherwise, it could not serve as an 
example of ambiguity.  Meaningless strings of letters are not examples 
of ambiguity.  In contrast, it is easy for a defender of word meaning to 
explain what is going on here.  The word “cat” has two meanings, and it 
is used ambiguously in this context, because neither meaning is intended 




as the speaker meaning.  This kind of case, thus, shows the need for 
word meanings that are independent of what speakers mean. 
D.  The Intention to Mean Something Deviant 
The next argument by Alexander and Prakash cites two kinds of cases 
where words are used to mean something other than what they usually 
mean.  In one example, Mrs. Malaprop “asks you to make sure the 
‘autobahn’ is pulled next to the sofa when she comes to visit you—and 
you know that she intends for you to move the ‘ottoman.’”25
Alexander and Prakash seem to hold that the word “autobahn” in this 
case means “ottoman,” because that is what Mrs. Malaprop means by it.  
If this is their argument, then they conflate speaker meaning with word 
meaning.  Because of her intention, what Mrs. Malaprop means—her 
speaker meaning—is about the ottoman.  Nonetheless, the word 
“autobahn” still means a German highway.  Its word meaning does not 
change when she misuses it.  That is how we know that Mrs. Malaprop 
made a mistake.  If the word “autobahn” actually meant “ottoman” when 
she used it, then there would be nothing wrong with her utterance.  Thus, 
far from undermining word meaning, this example cannot be understood 
without recognizing word meaning that is independent of speaker 
meaning and speakers’ intentions. 
In a note, Alexander and Prakash ask, “Is Mrs. Malaprop misspeaking 
in English, or is she speaking ‘Malapropenglish’?  Is slang that has yet to 
be validated by the Oxford English Dictionary ‘English’ or something 
else?  We cannot see that this is answerable in any way other than by 
arbitrary stipulation.”26  I agree that any answer to the question about 
slang would be arbitrary in most contexts.  In the case of Malaprop, 
however, she is clearly trying to speak standard English.  Her intention is 
reason to claim that she is misspeaking English.  Still, this does not 
matter to our main dispute.  Even if she were not speaking English or 
trying to speak English, her word “autobahn” still has a word meaning in 
English (it is listed in the OED!) or, at least, German. 
It might “not matter” for practical purposes what the word means in 
this case because “we are trying to discern what Ms. Malaprop means by 
‘autobahn.’”27  As Alexander and Prakash say, “if you are a dutiful child, 
you will pull up the ottoman and not attempt to relocate a German 
highway.”28  However, that is just because she is a nice woman, and her 
mistake was so clear that nobody got misled.  We could interpret her 
 25. Id. at 978. 
 26. Id. at 978 n.28. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 978. 
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utterance either according to her speaker meaning or according to her 
word meaning.  Polite people will choose her speaker meaning, because 
there is no point in being snippety.  In contrast, we would have reason to 
interpret her according to word meaning if Mrs. Malaprop wrote public 
laws.  Imagine that, as Queen, she promulgated a law declaring that it is 
illegal to own an autobahn.  A subject reads the law and then buys an 
ottoman, thinking that this is legal because the law is about autobahns.  
It would be unfair to find this subject guilty of disobeying the law, even 
if Queen Malaprop meant “ottoman” when she said “autobahn.”  The 
point is that laws should often be interpreted by their word meanings 
because citizens who try to obey the law usually assume reasonably that 
those words have their common word meanings (and people often do not 
have access to the intentions of legislators).  This will not always be the 
case, but sometimes it is, and then it seems only fair to interpret the law 
by its word meanings rather than by its intent.  Exclusive intentionalism 
cannot do justice to (or in) such cases. 
Alexander and Prakash’s other example does not involve a change 
from a common meaning to a deviant meaning.  Instead, it involves a 
meaningless sound that is used with a deviant meaning: “[I]f a speaker 
says, ‘Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg,’ it means what the speaker intended it to 
mean, even if to others it sounds like nonsense.”29  I grant, at least for 
the sake of argument, that “Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg” has the speaker meaning 
that the speaker intends.  As before, however, this string does not thereby 
obtain a word meaning.  To see why, imagine that a police officer says 
“Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg” to you.  Then the officer arrests you for not 
moving your car.  You complain, but the officer explains, “When I said, 
‘Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg,’ what I meant, and what my words meant was, 
‘Move your car immediately.’  So you disobeyed a direct order of a 
police officer.”  This is obviously unfair to you, but it would be hard to 
see why if the police officer’s words really did mean “Move your car 
immediately.”  What makes it unfair is that police orders, like laws, 
should be issued in common language with common meanings.  
Exclusive intentionalists cannot capture this aspect of public language.30
 29. Id. 
 30. Alexander and Prakash’s example of “strategery” resembles that of “Gleeg, 
gleeg, gleeg” insofar as “strategery” is not a word in standard English.  That is why I do 
not discuss it separately.  See id. 




Notice that this case is not like “the third base coach’s pulling on his 
ear with the successful intent to convey the idea ‘Bunt!’”31  What makes 
that signal meaningful is not merely that the coach has a certain intent.  
It is that the coach told the batters in advance what this signal means.  If 
the coach pulls on his ear without this intent, and the batter bunts as a 
result, the coach cannot fairly criticize the batter, because the coach did 
in fact give a meaningful signal, even if the coach did not intend to do 
so.  Conversely, if the coach intends pulling his ear to have this meaning, 
but he neglected to tell the batters what this signal means, then, if he 
intentionally gives the signal but the batters do not bunt, he cannot fairly 
charge the batters with disobeying his signal.  Such cases, thus, suggest 
that what gives the signal meaning is not the coach’s intent but the 
convention and common understanding shared by the coach and the 
batters.  Far from supporting exclusive intentionalism, such cases 
support its denial. 
E.  Context and Absurdity 
Alexander and Prakash’s fifth and final argument is really a group of 
distinct arguments.  The first deploys a standard example: “a ‘keep off the 
grass’ sign usually means something different on a lawn from what it 
means over a drug counselor’s office.”32  This is supposed to show that “texts 
must be read in context”33 and “[t]he additional contextual information 
is, unsurprisingly, information that provides evidence of the intent of the 
actual author.”34  Alexander and Prakash conclude, “context is universally 
regarded as relevant only because it is evidence of authorial intent.”35
This argument has several gaps.  First, even if the sign should be 
interpreted in light of what the author intended it to mean, that does not 
show that the sign does not have independent word meaning.  Otherwise, 
it would be hard to explain why the lawnkeeper or drug counselor chose 
a sign with those words instead of other words.  If word meaning did not 
matter, they could choose a sign with any words and those words would 
magically come to mean whatever they intend them to mean.  They 
could, for example, post a sign that reads only, “Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg.”  
To explain why they chose the signs that they did, we need to postulate 
meanings of the words on the sign.  Of course, the words on the counselor’s 
 31. Id. at 978 n.27. 
 32. Id. at 978–79; see also Gerald Graff, “Keep Off the Grass,” “Drop Dead,” 
and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 407–
08 (1982). 
 33. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 1, at 978. 
 34. Id. at 979. 
 35. Id. 
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sign might be ambiguous.  However, as we saw before, the fact that a word 
has more than one meaning does not show that it has no word meaning. 
Second, the fact that the sign should be interpreted in light of its 
context does not show that it should be interpreted in light of “the intent 
of the actual author.”36  Suppose the drug counselor puts the sign “keep 
off the grass” on the wall over his desk in his office.  He intends to tell 
his clients not to step on his grass on the way out.  However, a certain 
client does not know his intention.  This client thinks that the counselor 
is telling clients not to use marijuana.  The client then steps on the grass 
on the way out.  The drug counselor sees him do it, so he yells, “Don’t 
bother to come back.  I cannot help clients who directly disobey my 
orders.”  The client would have a legitimate complaint, and not just that 
the penalty is harsh or that he deserves a second chance.  The client 
could legitimately complain that it was reasonable for him to interpret 
the sign as meaning, “Don’t use marijuana,” and he did not disobey that 
command.  Admittedly, the client did not know the counselor’s intended 
meaning, so Alexander and Prakash could respond that the client’s 
interpretation was reasonable only because of his ignorance.  But suppose 
that we are observers who do know the counselor’s intent.  We could 
still say that it is unfair to interpret the sign as the counselor intends, 
because that interpretation is contrary to the meaning that most readers 
would have taken the sign to have in that context, so the sign can 
reasonably be interpreted in such a way that the client is not guilty of 
disobeying it.  The context is, then, relevant not because it is evidence of 
authorial intent, as Alexander and Prakash claim, but rather because it is 
evidence of how it is reasonable for readers to interpret the sign.  If that 
is right, this example cannot even show that the counselor’s intentions 
are important to interpretation. 
A different kind of context—linguistic context—gets invoked in an 
example of scrivener’s error: “if a statute containing ten provisions about 
‘cars’ has an eleventh dealing with ‘cas.’”37  According to Alexander and 
Prakash, exclusive textualism implies that “the eleventh should be understood 
as gibberish.”38  I agree, of course, that “cas” here should be interpreted as 
“cars.”  But what does this show?  It does not show that word meaning is 
incoherent or unimportant.  Indeed, we could not tell that “cas” was 
nonsense if we did not know that it lacks the kind of word meaning that 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 980. 
 38. Id. 




“cars” has.  The most that this example shows is that some reference to 
legislative intention is needed in order to interpret “cas” as “cars.” 
The same point is supported by the scrivener’s error in the Seventeenth 
Amendment.  We interpret that Amendment as making a permanent 
change in the way Senators are elected.  Our interpretation cannot be 
based on the word meaning, which suggests a change for six years only.  
Instead, our interpretation seems to be based on our beliefs about what 
the legislators intended.  Thus, some reference to legislative intention 
seems to be needed for interpretation in such cases.39
This is enough to refute exclusive textualists who hold that intention 
has nothing to do with interpretation.  This is a problem for Justice 
Scalia, whom Alexander and Prakash criticize on this basis.40  I will let 
Scalia defend himself because I do not claim that interpretation can be 
done properly without any reference to any intentions. 
My admission is still compatible with mixed theories which hold that 
both intentions and word meanings are and should be factors in 
interpretation.  Word meaning might even still be primary in the sense 
that laws should be interpreted by their common word meanings, even 
when those conflict with legislative intentions, except when the word 
meanings meet a high standard of absurdity (such as that it should be 
clear to all or most citizens that the legislators did not intend the literal 
word meaning).  When the word meaning is very absurd, the general 
public does not base its acts on the absurd interpretation.  Thus, the 
general public cannot claim to have been unfairly misled by the words of 
the law.  That makes it less problematic to invoke legislative intentions 
in this restricted range of cases. 
None of this refutes the claim that Alexander and Prakash set out to 
refute.  Their target was the claim that “texts can be interpreted without 
any reference, express or implied, to the meaning intended by the author 
of the text.”41  The fact that some texts have scrivener’s errors might 
show that those texts cannot be interpreted without reference to some 
intentions of authors.  However, it does not show that all texts must be 
interpreted by or only by the author’s intended meaning.  Nor does it 
show anything wrong with the notion of word meaning independent of 
speaker meaning or speaker’s intent. 
 39. See Peter Jeremy Smith, Commas, Constitutional Grammar, and the Straight-
Face Test: What if Conan the Grammarian Were a Strict Textualist, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 
7, 14 (1999).  Another possibility is that we base our interpretation not on any intention 
but instead on a practice, namely, the common practice of reading the Seventeenth 
Amendment as making a permanent change in how Senators are elected. 
 40. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 1, at 979. 
 41. Id. at 968. 
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Perhaps a misunderstanding has occurred.  Alexander and Prakash make 
very strong claims, but maybe they should be interpreted more charitably.  
Perhaps they did not mean what their words mean.  I admit that exclusive 
judicial textualism is indefensible, because some reference to legislative 
intentions is necessary in some cases.  Maybe Alexander and Prakash 
will admit that exclusive judicial intentionalism is also indefensible, 
because some reference to the meanings of words in laws is necessary in 
some cases.  We cannot go home for a good night’s sleep yet, however, 
because the hard task remains.  We need to determine when word 
meaning matters (and why), when speaker meaning matters (and why), 
and how to solve conflicts between these factors in interpretation.  An 
adequate theory of interpretation is bound to be complex.  It cannot rest 
on any one factor alone.  Alexander and Prakash seem to deny this, but, 
if they did not mean to deny it, then I am happy to interpret them in 
accordance with their intentions. 
III.  WORD MEANING IN THE LAW 
It should be clear by now why word meaning matters to the interpretation 
of marks on the ground, office signs, baseball signals, and odes.  Word 
meanings must be cited to explain dialects, malapropisms, ambiguity, 
and so on.  I could add metaphor, irony, and rhetorical questions.  But why 
is word meaning important to legal interpretation in particular?  To 
answer this question, I need to place my linguistic points in the context 
of legal theory. 
Many legal theorists seem to present law almost as a private conversation 
between judges and legislators.  This view lies behind, for example, the 
metaphor of a judge as “a faithful agent of the lawmaker,” to which 
Alexander and Prakash refer often.42  When I tell my agent (such as my 
stock broker or literary agent) what to do on my behalf, the conversation 
is between my agent and me.  Other people might listen and might care 
what we do, but the main goal of our conversation is normally to serve 
our purposes and affect our actions, rather than the interests and actions 
of other people. 
In such private conversations, what matters most to interpretation is 
usually the speaker’s intentions.  My agent’s job is to fulfill my intentions, 
so my intentions guide my agent’s interpretation of what I say.  This point 
also comes out in conversations with Mrs. Malaprop.  If we interpreted 
 42. See id. at 989, 992–93. 




her according to the meanings of her words rather than according to 
what she intended to say, we would be impolite, she would be offended, 
and nothing would be gained, apart from laughs for insensitive jokers.  
In contrast, when we interpret Mrs. Malaprop according to her 
intentions, we get along with her, and nobody gets hurt.  No listener is 
misled by what she says, so no reasonable expectations are violated if 
we interpret her by her intentions instead of by her words. 
The same points might seem to apply to law if law were merely a 
private conversation between legislators and judges.  Presumably, legislators 
are nice people, like Mrs. Malaprop, who do not aim to mislead.  If 
nobody else were involved, and if judges could tell that legislators did 
not intend to say what their words mean, then nothing legitimate would 
be gained by interpreting legislators according to their word meaning.  
Of course, judges might gain something for themselves by taking 
legislators at their word.  Judges would gain power if they could choose 
to interpret by word meaning instead of by speaker meaning whenever 
they like the word meaning better.  But then judges would seem as 
selfish as the insensitive jokers who have fun at Mrs. Malaprop’s 
expense. 
Of course, this model of law is way too simple.43  Legislators and judges 
are not engaged in private conversations.  The public listens.  Moreover, the 
public is not eavesdropping.  The conversation is directed at the public 
insofar as the goal of law is to control public behavior and serve the public 
interest.  Thus, as Alexander and Prakash themselves sometimes suggest, 
law is often a public conversation between legislators and citizens.44
Law is also often cited in conversations between citizens and other 
citizens.  One person can affect another person’s behavior by invoking 
the law: “Get off my property or I’ll have the police arrest you for 
trespassing.”  “If you sign this contract, I will give you that money, but 
then you will be legally required to do these things for me.  If you fail, I 
will sue.”  Normal people say such things to each other (or assume them) 
because of their understanding of what the law is. 
Because the law involves and affects normal citizens in such ways, it 
needs to be publicly accessible.  Citizens need to be able to interpret the 
law.  How can they do that?  They might ask lawyers, but that can 
quickly become expensive.  Citizens might research legislative intent 
themselves, but that can take lots of time and training, and the evidence 
is often unavailable, skimpy, or conflicting.  Citizens might guess what 
 43. Some textualism “starts from the faithful agent premise . . .,” id. at 992 (quoting 
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001)), 
but my mixed theory does not.  That is part of why it escapes Alexander and Prakash’s 
arguments. 
 44. See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 1, at 970. 
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legislators intended, but that can be risky.  Consequently, citizens often 
interpret laws on the basis of what the words in those laws normally 
mean.  These public word meanings are usually accessible to competent 
speakers of the language.  This method of interpretation, thus, seems 
both natural and reasonable in many contexts. 
One such context is copyright law.  Suppose I need to determine 
whether I need to get permission for quoting a passage from someone 
else’s book.  I might go to a lawyer, but maybe I cannot afford one, so I 
read the law myself.  Most laws are much more complicated, but 
imagine that this one reads simply, “Permission from the copyright 
holder is required for quotations of more than one hundred words from a 
song or more than five hundred words from any other source.”  Then it 
is reasonable for me to assume that I am not legally required to get 
permission to quote four hundred words from a poem.  I do not need to 
check the records to make sure that the legislature did not intend to 
include poems as a kind of song in their idiolect.  If they did intend that, 
they should have written the law differently, and I should not be held 
responsible for their mistake.  If the author of the poem sues me, then the 
judge should interpret the law according to its actual word meaning, so I 
should not have to pay any damages or even a permission fee after 
publication because I acted reasonably in interpreting the law as I did.  If 
the legislature wants to change the law so that it reads “from a song or 
poem,” then they may do so.  But that changes the law.  Before that 
change, the proper interpretation of the law is determined by the word 
meaning of “song,” even if the legislators all intended to include poems.  
When word meaning is clear, it trumps intention, at least in this area of 
law. 
The point is perhaps even clearer in the context of criminal law.  
Oversimplifying again, suppose a law reads, “Nobody may carry a 
handgun with a barrel under six inches long and a knife with a blade 
over six inches long.”  A citizen reads this law and wants to abide by it, 
so he carries a gun with a barrel under six inches long and leaves his 
foot-long knife at home.  When he is arrested, he argues that the law 
forbids carrying both weapons, but he was carrying only one.  The 
prosecution argues, of course, that the legislature intended, “Nobody 
may carry either a handgun with a barrel under six inches long or a knife 
with a blade over six inches long.”  This intention is shown by how the 
legislature described the law in their debates.  The judge might hold that 
the gun-toter’s interpretation was unreasonable, because it was obvious 
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what the legislature meant.  However, if it is reasonable for the gun-toter 
to interpret the law according to its literal word meaning, then the judge 
should not convict the gun-toter.  Later the judge and prosecutor can 
send a note to the legislature asking them to reword the law.  In the 
meantime, the judge should interpret the law so that it does not forbid 
what the gun-toter did.  Why?  Because that is what the words of the law 
mean. 
Exclusive intentionalists might complain that this example is too easy 
because of logical relations between the word and speaker meanings: 
anybody who carries both a short handgun and a long knife must also 
carry either a short handgun or a long knife.  However, the point still 
holds if a law is ambiguous and neither word meaning implies the other.  
Suppose a law says, “Nobody may own any mortar.”  A bricklayer 
assumes that this law forbids a kind of cannon rather than the mixture 
that he uses to join bricks, so he continues to use that mixture.  Even if 
the legislature actually intended to outlaw mortar for bricks (instead of 
or in addition to the kind of cannon), the bricklayer should not be 
convicted if his interpretation is reasonable. 
Behind such examples lie general principles: When a citizen acts in a 
way that is allowed by the law on a reasonable interpretation, then it is 
unfair to subject that citizen to either civil damages or criminal 
punishment for that act.  Why?  One reason is that the citizen could not 
know that the act would be subject to such sanctions.  Even if some 
other interpretation is also reasonable, if the interpretation that allows 
the act is reasonable, this option excludes the ability to know that the law 
forbids the act. 
A similar standard of knowledge holds in science: If observed trends 
in global temperatures can be interpreted either as natural fluctuations or 
as caused by human activities, then we cannot know whether or not 
those trends are caused by humans.  Future data might settle the issue, 
but the current data is not enough to give us knowledge.  More 
generally, when it is reasonable to interpret the data in either of two 
ways, we cannot know which interpretation is correct.  The same holds 
in law.  When either of two interpretations is reasonable, then we cannot 
know what the law is. 
Now add another premise: When someone cannot know what the law 
is, that person should not be held criminally or civilly liable for violating 
that law.  This principle has been accepted by legal theorists from legal 
positivists to natural law theorists.  It lies behind the traditional requirement 
that laws be publicized or promulgated.  Admittedly, many citizens do 
not bother to read the law, but, as Fuller wrote: 
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Even if only one man in a hundred takes the pains to inform himself concerning, 
say, the laws applicable to the practice of his calling, this is enough to justify 
the trouble taken to make the laws generally available.  This citizen at least is 
entitled to know, and he cannot be identified in advance.45
It follows that a person should not be held criminally or civilly liable 
for violating a law when that person’s act is allowed by a reasonable 
interpretation of that law.  Add that it is reasonable for common citizens 
to interpret the law according to its word meaning in many cases, like 
the examples above.  This shows why the public meanings of the words 
in a law should guide interpretation of that law in many cases. 
This also shows why it is not “silly or pernicious . . . as a practical 
matter” to recognize that some laws have two word meanings.46  When 
judges recognize laws as ambiguous, they can take this fact into 
consideration and not convict anyone who honestly tries to abide by a 
reasonable interpretation of the law.  If judges could not recognize 
ambiguity, they would have to convict law abiding citizens unfairly.47
There might be other cases where a word is ambiguous, but it is not 
reasonable to interpret the law by one of its word meanings.  Perhaps it 
would be unreasonable to interpret the law against “any mortar” as 
forbidding the mixture that joins bricks but allowing the kind of cannon 
also called a “mortar.”  Then judges may convict people who own such 
cannons.  Still, when it is reasonable to interpret the law by one of its 
word meanings, citizens should not be sanctioned for abiding by that 
word meaning. 
Similarly, it might not be reasonable to interpret a law by its word 
meaning when word meaning obviously conflicts with intention.  
Examples include scrivener’s errors, such as in Alexander and Prakash’s 
“statute containing ten provisions about ‘cars’ [that] has an eleventh 
dealing with ‘cas.’”  This law should be interpreted by its intention, as I 
already granted.  But that hardly shows that intention or speaker meaning 
should trump word meaning in cases where the mistake is less obvious, 
so the public might be reasonably misled or confused. 
 45. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 51 (1964). 
 46. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 1, at 988. 
 47. This would be a problem for intentionalism if, as Alexander and Prakash 
claim, “intentionalism will always yield no more than one meaning.”  Id. at 988 n.50.  
This claim, however, is dubious because legislators (like other people) can act on 
multiple intentions at a single time. 
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I also admit that in other areas of law it is less clear whether word 
meaning or speaker meaning should guide interpretation.  As an example 
of constitutional law, consider the religion clauses of the First Amendment.  
They read on the surface like commands from the ratifiers to legislatures 
to be enforced by judges, so they might seem to fit the “faithful agent” 
model (at least in cases such as taxation of religious enterprises).  However, 
ordinary citizens who read the words of the First Amendment form 
expectations that certain kinds of activities will not be outlawed, and 
then they act on their expectations (such as by practicing their religions).  
To violate legitimate expectations based on reasonable interpretations is 
unfair.  Still, other things might be worse, so judges might have to weigh 
other factors, including legislative intentions.  Thus, although word meaning 
has some force in this area, it is not clear when word meaning determines 
the best interpretation of such constitutional clauses. 
There still might be some areas of law where word meaning should 
not guide judicial interpretation at all.  Perhaps intent is all that matters 
in private contracts and wills.  I take no stand on that possibility.  My 
thesis is only that word meaning is coherent and is an important and 
even decisive factor in interpreting many kinds of laws.  It is surprising 
that anyone would deny such a modest thesis. 
 
